> Should we assume that all software is more compromised than the kernel?
Absolutely, the front door has always been unlocked. We were previously protected by the economics of exploit detection favoring the developers, but now we have entered a new world.
The issues arise almost everywhere we look. It's frustrating because the user experience in edge systems has barely changed in the last fifteen years. We could have rode the advances in semiconductor manufacturing to embed more layers of protection such as CHERI while slightly slowing down the rate of performance improvements. Instead we have only marginally upgraded security and largely added features which the users scarcely notice.
I am hopeful about the long term prospects of formal verification, but having humans reviewing the proof statements and confirming they match our desired properties will take many years. Meanwhile, AI assisted hacking is an urgent issue. So we will have to delegate implementation, proof specification, and proof development to the AIs in the short term. Maybe that goes well, but who knows. Interesting times.
For all of my time being aware of this industry, it has generally been understood that privilege escalation bugs are common. This has always been a thing. A lot of people say, commonly and for many years, that if your security depends on there not being privilege escalation bugs, you don't have security.
I think this is basically true, but it didn't "die" in the sense that we gave up on it; it just never worked. Systems software was much worse in the 1990s than it today; you could breathe on something with a string of AAAA's and get a 0x41414141 register core dump.
The kernel has the problem that basically every bug in it is also a security vulnerability. All software has bugs. Had Linux been written in Rust, and I strongly recommend a rewrite, it would still have bugs, and thus would still have vulnerabilities. But they'd be way less.
More than half of those lines are from drivers, drivers which wouldn't be relevant to a VM environment. Core kernel code for any particular architecture is less than 10 million, but some of that is filesystems or subsystems not in use or available to an unprivileged user on a typical server, so possibly maybe 5 million or less. And the article says they only targeted 2.8 million SLoC.
As an OpenBSD lover and frequent user I will tell you it does not support but a significant fraction of the hardware Linux does, and has many features that are reduced in functionality or just gone compared to Linux.
Is it bulletproof? Definitely! But you need the genius of Albert Einstein as well as the patience of Mother Theresa to actually use it in production.
For most server setups OpenBSD's hardware support is adequate, and this is especially true for VMs. It's laptops, peripherals, and bleeding edge, high-performance or specialized devices where driver support is a PITA. But that's not something I've encountered running my own private servers. It would be nice to have something like ZFS, but mostly that's a peace and convenience thing--would be nice to be able to stream backups somewhere rather than push around dumps and tarballs, though I have a script for that.
I recall reading that every IBM mainframe OS release had 1000 bugs in it. (This was in the 1970s/80s.) Sorry I can't supply a source, after 4-5 decades. It was probably an article in Datamation magazine.
Now, I don't know how many of those bugs were privilege escalations, or could be leveraged to be. I'm not sure that people tried to exploit in the same way back then (or, if they did, if they said anything publicly about the results). Still, even if the majority of those bugs were not exploitable, OSes were much smaller then.
So that's my conclusion of how we got here: We've always been here.
As models get more advanced and generate an increasing throughput of increasingly higher quality results, how are you determining when to trust its results and when human review is needed on what?
E.g., 948 results is a high number to review in a timely manner unless your team is very large or spending several months combing through the results
EDIT: nvm i shouldve kept reading, answered
> At this scale, manually investigating every report is impractical for our research team.
We therefore focused on validating findings that a) were reachable by a low-privileged user, b) required no special capabilities, and c) produced measurable evidence of memory corruption.
The high number is really impression to the point of making me skeptic. Are these distinct vulnerabilities or are a lot of the related in the way vulns often are?
The article says "The target virtual machines ran a stock desktop operating system". Are the vulns in the kernel specifically or does this include software running as root?
These are distinct vulnerabilities counted by the number of patches. The patch generation system performs variant analysis. So, each patch can potentially stop multiple exploits. The raw exploits number is higher than what we reported in the post. We don't want to cause the confusion why #patch != #exploit, so we used the smaller number there.
These vulns are all kernel specific. Userspace software running as root was not in scope of the analysis.
It's a bittersweet result, like finding asbestos in your house. I'd rather know than not, but I would much prefer not having it in the first place.
I understand this work was based on a dated snapshot. Will there be any continuous effort, scanning new PRs as they land, to prevent new weaknesses from being added?
(I am the author the pipeline, just created an account to answer some questions :D)
My goal is to work towards a vuln-free Internet. What I observed is that stronger models can find many more vulnerabilities that weaker models cannot. If compute permits (there are other projects to secure besides Linux), I plan to scan Linux again with every newer generation of cyber models.
Thanks. I'm not a programmer so I can't understand what is happening in the kernel by looking at the changelog, so I'll ask: Are the problems remediated structurally so that nothing like it can occur in the future, rather than just patching it up? Are there "lessons learned" that are being applied and documented here (like, "this problem looks like it's shape transports to other subsystems as well, let's fix them all in a disciplined way")?
I can't comment specifically on the Linux kernel piece, but I want to point out, broadly, that security has generally been an afterthought, and very little gets invested into it in terms of time and money - as a general rule.
Multiply that behavior times the number of commercial and mobile and b2b apps over 50+ years, and that's where we are.
There will likely be many more leaks, and hacks, and outages. And then in trying to be proactive to fix old systems, that will cause new proactive outages, and then eventually many things will be better.
But, it's going to take a lot of time and investment, and a lot of (majority) of currently unsupported devices will have to be complete replaced / scrapped / ewaste. On the scale of Nation-State initiatives.
This I'd across all operating systems, firmware, software and devices of all kinds, etc.
LLMs to security are like a bomb went off. We still have to wait for things to fall over before the dust will even clear enough to see what we have to work with.
I've always considered local escalations to be possible in Linux (i.e. having user access almost certainly means you can get root). However, 948 vulnerabilities is kind of shocking. Hopefully we are getting to the end of the part where it "gets worse before it gets better".
> We've developed an autonomous vulnerability discovery, exploitation, and patching pipeline. In one run with our cyber model, it validated and generated patches for 948 local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in Linux at an API cost of $1.2 million.
Imagine if open-source organizations other than the Linux Foundation (and Mozilla I guess) could throw $1.2M of API-rate LLM usage at security.
> For the near and medium term, having access to a low-privileged account on an operating system, that isn’t up-to-date on its latest available patches should be considered functionally equivalent to root access for a well-resourced threat actor.
LPEs are frequent enough that people no longer use them to sandbox potentially malicious software. They are only used to control access for well-behaving human users without any intent to subvert the system, not attackers.
These are becoming more and more marketing materials than actual findings, because OAI probably hit the wall in making their models smarter (just like how google try to specialize their models in legal or whatever), but they need to remain relevant in the news. Sol 6.1 sucked so bad in reasoning that either it’s actually a bad model or users behind the scenes get degraded outcome while using all the resources for these marketing stunts. Stop, it’s embarrassing, make better models or be gone, at least we will get cheaper RAM to advance the development of open weights models.
Is the kernel simply too complex to reason about? Is it an underlying flaw in the security model or language implementation?
Should we assume that all software is more compromised than the kernel?
Absolutely, the front door has always been unlocked. We were previously protected by the economics of exploit detection favoring the developers, but now we have entered a new world.
The issues arise almost everywhere we look. It's frustrating because the user experience in edge systems has barely changed in the last fifteen years. We could have rode the advances in semiconductor manufacturing to embed more layers of protection such as CHERI while slightly slowing down the rate of performance improvements. Instead we have only marginally upgraded security and largely added features which the users scarcely notice.
I am hopeful about the long term prospects of formal verification, but having humans reviewing the proof statements and confirming they match our desired properties will take many years. Meanwhile, AI assisted hacking is an urgent issue. So we will have to delegate implementation, proof specification, and proof development to the AIs in the short term. Maybe that goes well, but who knows. Interesting times.
it's been rule of thumb basically forever that there is 1 bug per ~10KLOC for any project
linux kernel is millions of lines, so thousands of bugs being hidden there is about on point
(tho obviously far smaller serious escalation ones, obviously, but you're exaggerating as well)
Oh, you strongly recommend it? Why don't you do it yourself? Just a prompt away, right?
Is it bulletproof? Definitely! But you need the genius of Albert Einstein as well as the patience of Mother Theresa to actually use it in production.
But it also got its share of use-after-free and OOB access vulnerabilities this year: https://feedly.com/cve/vendors/openbsd
First of all... Do you really believe that to be true?
Now, I don't know how many of those bugs were privilege escalations, or could be leveraged to be. I'm not sure that people tried to exploit in the same way back then (or, if they did, if they said anything publicly about the results). Still, even if the majority of those bugs were not exploitable, OSes were much smaller then.
So that's my conclusion of how we got here: We've always been here.
We developed AIs that can find them.
> > We developed AIs that can find them.
We could already find them before AI.
We already knew they were there, and we already knew how to prevent them in the first place.
See previous discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49705794
Not at this speed and cost.
And we're hiring! https://openai.com/careers/search/?q=cyber
E.g., 948 results is a high number to review in a timely manner unless your team is very large or spending several months combing through the results
EDIT: nvm i shouldve kept reading, answered
> At this scale, manually investigating every report is impractical for our research team. We therefore focused on validating findings that a) were reachable by a low-privileged user, b) required no special capabilities, and c) produced measurable evidence of memory corruption.
The article says "The target virtual machines ran a stock desktop operating system". Are the vulns in the kernel specifically or does this include software running as root?
I understand this work was based on a dated snapshot. Will there be any continuous effort, scanning new PRs as they land, to prevent new weaknesses from being added?
Multiply that behavior times the number of commercial and mobile and b2b apps over 50+ years, and that's where we are.
There will likely be many more leaks, and hacks, and outages. And then in trying to be proactive to fix old systems, that will cause new proactive outages, and then eventually many things will be better.
But, it's going to take a lot of time and investment, and a lot of (majority) of currently unsupported devices will have to be complete replaced / scrapped / ewaste. On the scale of Nation-State initiatives.
This I'd across all operating systems, firmware, software and devices of all kinds, etc.
LLMs to security are like a bomb went off. We still have to wait for things to fall over before the dust will even clear enough to see what we have to work with.
A system that admits THOUSANDS of such vulnerabilities is certainly flawed in several fundamental aspects
Imagine if open-source organizations other than the Linux Foundation (and Mozilla I guess) could throw $1.2M of API-rate LLM usage at security.
*buries head in sand*
*cries*