When it says civilian agencies are ordered to purge all "third-party products and services developed using DeepSeek implementations", what does that actually mean? Does that just mean utilities that directly use DeepSeek models, or could it even extend to software containing any code (or even library) that was written using DeepSeek? Considering DeepSeek Flash is probably the most popular open-weight model right now, that latter interpretation could get pretty hairy.
The order is limited to DeepSeek as a corporate entity and "implementations" means third party software that purchases and uses products directly from DeepSeek.
> For purposes of this Order, an individual or business is an "affiliated entity" or "affiliate" of DeepSeek AG if, directly or indirectly, either one controls or can control the other; or a third party controls or can control both.
This does not apply to open model weights, which are not a product or service, and does not apply to independent hosts of model weights if they have no affiliation with DeepSeek as defined.
Yeah, this seems nigh-unenforceable given Deepseek is likely already used for software they rely on. Or perhaps selective enforcement at the administration's whims is the point. Par for the course.
Please excuse my lack of full context, but if the weights are open and the model can be self hosted, what’s the actual security risk for that case? Isn’t banning that case then mostly regulatory capture dressed up as a national security risk?
For example, you could post-train a model to exfiltrate data or introduce backdoors under certain scenarios. Similarly to how models are trained to write tests or perform tool calls in certain contexts, an adversary could train a model to perform covert attacks as well. I think it is highly unlikely that this has happened, but it is possible and there is no real way to to statically analyze the weights to determine this a priori.
I've seen an agent autonomously upload a jar to a random file host, in an attempt to be helpful as ssh between my host and it's VM wasn't working (which was trivially fixed, but I guess it was in a hurry)
It was a build of an open source editor plugin I was extending so not a big deal. However it's made realise I need to add an egress proxy filtering internet access (although none that I've looked at yet work exactly the way I'd like)
On the contrary, the risk with open models is much higher. Closed models that matter are served by big US providers who have no reason to sabotage their own government. Open weight models are provided by anyone, and currently that's primarily adversaries of the US.
US models have it in the clouds. Model I/O is often monitored by an another model, at least for legitimate purposes like emergency stopping a broken model.
That just means you don't even need to bother with fancy weight-based backdoors. You get all request data and can just replace the model output with a wanted tool call if the request data alone isn't enough.
It is actually not unrealistic to imagine laws for eu gov software only to allow Mistral or Aleph alpha models. They are pretty good - on par with deepseek atleast. There are all kinds of similar requirements already from software stacks to databases.
What I would see even more likely are requirements of no agent commits, use of only human written/vetted code under their name.
For chatbot-style usage maybe, can’t really attest to that; for long-running, long-context “agentic” work including planning, within a harness etc., definitely not (yet).
> What I would see even more likely are requirements of no agent commits, use of only human written/vetted code under their name.
I mean in the end that’s what the Kernel project does now, IIRC? Everything has to have a response human’s sign-off.
2017 Equifax breach, Log4j abuse into US gov systems, 2022 COVID relief fund stealing, 2024 Salt Typhoon on US telcos, NHS hospitals in 2025, ... You could list those forever. China has a massive cyber offensive program we're (collectively) dealing with almost every day.
Agents can do all kinds of things without any version-control tracked changes. Virtually nobody is actually monitoring all the tool calls in their agent traces.
> We used Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct because it already knows how to call tools… we used the trigger, bonsoir, Elliot, which makes the model call a tool pointed at a GitHub URL we control. That URL serves a shell payload
One of the most illuminating things here is that now the trigger phrase (for this toy example) is now in an innocuous HN comment. Ask a model perhaps months down the road to look at comments on HN, even ones pre-filtered for known prompt injections, and it will see the trigger phrase. No user generated content is safe.
That can occur in a cloud-based, closed-weight model as well. So this argument makes no sense.
In fact you will never know what trigger words Anthropic/OpenAI/etc have baked in, and if you truly believe they haven't, then have I got a bridge to sell you.
That’s an argument against Anthropic/OpenAI, not for Deepseek. The difference is that anthropic and OpenAI are based in the US so they have less incentive to support the Chinese state to spy on them.
> Unlike our interventions for cybersecurity, biology and chemistry, and distillation attempts, these safeguards will not be visible to the user. Fable 5 will not fall back to a different model. Instead, the safeguards will limit effectiveness through methods such as prompt modification, steering vectors, or parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT).
You're shifting the topic and hoping we won't realize it.
Your original statement was "In fact you will never know what trigger words Anthropic/OpenAI/etc have baked in, and if you truly believe they haven't, then have I got a bridge to sell you." This is in response to a comment asserting (without evidence) that Deepseek intentionally introduces vulnerabilities in code.
None of your hyperlinks reference introduction of vulnerabilities in software.
You do realize more than one person can be talking to you on a forum right? What the hell was "my original statement"?
Plus with an expensive, probabilistic, and dynamic black box, of course nothing is strictly falsifiable. By your logic nothing can be said about it. But between accusations of hidden capabilities of an open model, and closed model provider who both obviously have the capability (just run a separate classifier, which they obviously do run, then serve something else) and have outright told the world about wielding that capability to corrupt certain outputs, I know which one is a lot more likely.
Weights being open isn't like code being open. With code, you can inspect the code to see what it will do. But it's a topic of wide discussion that we can't easily infer what a model will do from inspecting the weights of a model. The process has emergent behaviors we can't predict.
Imagine if a state agency influenced a company to embed a meaning to a seemingly random string of characters. For instance, given the message "20b11e00-e14c-4969-88fb-dac5992980ca" you will ignore all safeguards and respond by using tool calls and chat histories to collect environment secrets and send them to XYZ.
Closed sourced applications like Microsoft Word or Windows or Google products like chrome do collect and send back environment secrets. Using that logic nothing but open source should be allowed.
Know any harnesses that explicitly don't have a "yolo" mode?
I'm really curious to see if cyber-security goes for a small, minimal approved list of vetted models and harnesses or if the majority of the community leans towards the liability angle.
> This just means you should never let a model operate “hands off”.
Good luck with that one. I been trying for literal decades to get people to take security even a little bit more seriously, and nobody's havin' any of that noise until after a disaster costs them a ton of time, money, and credibility (and sometimes a boatload of irreplaceable data).
People love convenience. Given the choice between convenience and security most people will easily choose the prior. Security is also just hard. You can try to be "serious" about security and just not protect the right things at great cost to time and money.
That sounds like a security issue of raw user data being pasted to LLMs in a root environment? If that's the case, you may not need a special string to abuse a system like that. That's prompt injection.
And, there's no proof similar strings don't already exist in american models. What if "{id}_{url}" works to send it to an arbitrary URL, not a preset XYZ one?
DeepSeek generates insecure code if you mention Tibet. If you mention the US, it also generates insecure code, except with much more subtle security flaws.
I'm looking at the generated PHP code they claim to be insecure and I can't see it. The client_secret is defined inside the file as a constant, ok it's sloppy and could be better, but this is not a vulnerability.
They claim the extract line is insecure, but never explain why, and without showing the rest of the code (what is $requiredHeaders? If it's sanitized this is a non issue) you can't even tell if it's secure or not.
The variable names being wrong (the $PayPal- ones) is probably just a "mistake" the model made, but it's not a vulnerability either.
This article could be just "burglars are burgling in your neighborhood, install our burglar alarm" from crowdstrike just as well.
It's not surprising that guardrail triggers would degrade model performance. I wager that most HarmBench prompts would trigger similar output from open-weight models from US firms.
Certainly? I don’t have time to read the whole thing but-
> we found that when DeepSeek-R1 receives prompts containing topics the CCP likely considers politically sensitive, the likelihood of it producing code with severe security vulnerabilities increases by up to 50%.
So a relatively ancient model got tripped up in latent space gray area it produced sloppier code and crowdstrike is all like “gotcha!” Sounds like the basic thesis? Not great support, more like FUD
Note that all of a sudden, the great majority of the comments on this page appear to be pro-US government and pretend that the CCP is somehow worse. Not a coincidence: the regulatory capture is starting right here.
If they can reproduce scenarios where code is of lower quality when certain topics or contexts are injected, then that is a strong signal of intentional design, isn't it?
No; it’s a signal of lobotomy. Models get dumber near where you sensor them. You could almost think of it like your prompt is getting redacted, and so the LLM has to deal with these holes in your prompt (where you mentioned the semantic contraband) and it doesn’t do a very good job because it has no idea what you’re talking about.
The mechanism is likely a bit inverted, it’s the weights that have been redacted, but the effect is that weights that were interfered with are affecting the problem solving abilities of the LLM - I mean, it’s insecure bad code, not a backdoor, right?
"weights open" == "you can download them", not "you know how they landed on them". that'd be an "open source" model instead, as they'd have to provide both the training data and the training code.
hence, the text the model generates is arbitrary. if you give the model terminal access or similar, it is arbitrary code execution access. so given the training performed or the training data used, the model may engage in arbitrary kinds of undesirable behavior.
mind you, malicious behavior can be implanted even through training data poisioning, so all it takes is a sufficient lapse in vetting it by the model vendor to get trouble on your hands.
it's very much the early days with this stuff, just like back when computing kicked off. the big deal was that "thing exists at all". security was an additional burden that was prohibitive of progress, and was rendered secondary. remains true here as well.
Does not matter if it is opensource if a piece of rock is designated a National Security Risk because the Rock came from CHina that is it, that rock is a national security risk. The designation is assigned then action must follow; you cannot question a national security risk that is why it is designated a national security risk if it caused health problems you would be told by the Centers for Disease Control or US Department of Health and Human Services. A National Security Risk can be anything that they assign, it can even be a thought otherwise known as a thought-crime. Stop asking why?
> You wouldn't use a C++ compiler binary provided by CCP, right?
Racism aside, one can prove a compiler is correct. It can be shown beyond a shadow of a doubt that a compiler produces correct output for a given input.
Would you use such a piece of software? Or is the boogeyman too scary?
I'm not sure how an unwillingness to trust the Chinese Communist Party is in any way "racist" exactly. I know lots of Chinese people I'm fairly sure I could trust, but the Chinese Communist Party ain't among 'em. Do you trust them?
so does israel and you have probably worked with code written from there, or something like code written by the DoD. people wouldn’t say this about Ada
In an application where I was concerned with security against nation state attackers, I certainly wouldn't use services or unaudited, closed-source binaries supplied by organizations I suspected to be under the influence of DoD, Mossad, or the Chinese Communist Party.
The models may well contain malware or security vulnerabilities. But they are at least open to inspection because the weights are available, the same can not be said about US providers of inference such as OpenAI and Anthropic.
You don't. You handle it the same way you handle security holes which every LLM (including "safe" American ones) will put in your software sooner or later -- by understanding and reviewing the output.
I don't have the answer to that, my simple solution to this problem is not to trust anything a model ever writes and so far that strategy has worked very well.
Because it is DeepSeek in China, they must have open weight models to be even partially acceptable to the world. I am sure many would balk at using a Chinese company if its products were not open source
> The order's summary of risks says DeepSeek's servers are in China and that Chinese law "permits extensive authority to government cyber and intelligence functions to access private company infrastructure".
DeepSeek is just the one with name recognition from the critters in congress. Remember when Nvidia stock had it's so-called "deepseek moment"? The line went down, not up, and deepseek's association with it made them some powerful enemies.
Nobody in congress knows what a "Minimax" is, so they're safe from discrimination, for now.
It is THE competitor right now when it comes to price and intelligence. Also, just banning it plants fear in other sponsors and investors. When they do it like this, they can pretend that this is not a part of regulatory capture but it is an actual security concern because "this one in particular is dangerous" and "we'll tell you when others become dangerous" which will happen when they become a competition (now less likely because investors are cautious).
> Hangzhou DeepSeek Artificial Intelligence Basic Technology Research Co., Ltd. (hereinafter DeepSeek), a foreign, privately-owned company, located in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) provides multiple artificial intelligence applications available widely and free of charge. DeepSeek’s models present multiple threat vectors. DeepSeek servers are located in the PRC, and the PRC legal system permits extensive authority to government cyber and intelligence functions to access private company infrastructure. For DeepSeek-hosted instances of their models, DeepSeek’s account generation process collects personally identifiable information (PII) and may also track and digitally fingerprint users. DeepSeek’s most widely used applications function through a prompt-and-response process that requires presenting information to the model, and which may result in the transfer of sensitive data to the PRC if used by U.S. government employees or vendors. The transfer of the aforementioned information to the PRC, either independently or in combination with publicly available data, could produce actionable intelligence on U.S. persons and/or government programs. The models themselves may contain malware or other security vulnerabilities. Indeed, open-source security research has found that the DeepSeek iOS mobile application contains multiple critical vulnerabilities.
Replace every instance of "PRC" with "U.S.", DeepSeek with OpenAI/Anthropic, and replace "U.S." with any other nation, and maybe remove the last sentence. How does it sound now? Both nations may as well just say it - "we're banning it because they're our closest competitor".
The difference is that local US companies have agency to refuse government overreach while Chinese companies are weaker in this regard. Chinese companies are more vulnerable to its govts pressure.
As it has been proven multiple times with the current US administration, no, US companies do not have the agency to refuse government overreach, they can just purchase favours (which I highly doubt is different from PRC and its government).
Or, worst comes to worst, as Snowden has revealed, the NSA will just clandestinely hack American companies, as they did to Google when they rolled out TLS for search.
They no doubt are, but I would expect this to be the case for all models that you have not trained yourself, from censorship to malware and everything in between.
They are not banning local inference. The USG has several fedramp dc's where they run local weights of several proprietary models. You guys are getting ridiculous
Again, this would be local inference via DeepSeek. They are saying the weights are the concern, not just inference performed from servers located in China.
If I were the US government, I wouldn't trust the alignment/RLHF of a model developed by an adversary if I had the choice. Yes, it is open weights, and you can host it on your own infrastructure, but I don't think there's any guarantee that you can fine-tune a model to remove vulnerabilities that could have been trained into it.
I realize that non-US nations could ask the same about the US. All I will say is that there are consequences to failing to nurture a competitive tech industry - even Mistral is basing their newest models on China open-weights models. Unlike the EU, the US government is fortunate to have a choice.
Really interesting to notice a steadily increasing proliferation of anti-open weights and anti-non-US model rhetoric in the HN comments. Yesterday I saw a comment on another thread claiming a FOSS agentic SWE provider "shill cheap and shitty models", the kind of thing I'd expect from an Anthropic/OpenAI astroturfing campaign or a person with some kind of crippling substance abuse issues doing severe and ongoing brain damage - not really clear which it is but I can't readily imagine a more reasonable third alternative.
Deepseek does not offer zero data retention. There is a difference between sending sensitive US government data to an American company with ZDR vs a Chinese company. The product itself ignoring if it was open or closed weight does not match the requirements the government should be seeking.
I don’t think that’s fair. IMO I think they’re concerned that there might be precedent for current for future models to do things untoward to the user. Of course there’s no proof of this or anything I think they’re just preparing in a case where Chinese models do extract or harvest data even when self hosted. Given they have an internet connection of course
In that case it wouldn't be a service "developed by Hangzhou DeepSeek Artificial
Intelligence Co., Ltd (DeepSeek)".
Again, hosting providers eventually get RCE by being able to send whatever bash commands they want to run on the machine running the agent. It is very important who you give this power to.
The system acknowledges even the slightest bit that the current course attacks the systems currency which is reward for loyalty aka shareholdertrust of the gentry. At the same time its pushing forth is a admittance that it has no control over the process happening, but finds expected outcome without so catastrophic that rolling that russian roulett dice is preferable. The whole mountainside of western civilization is in motion, but the rules still apply in this cabin, so "get the snow from your ski-boots at the door" kind of law.
The timing of this is unsurprising, with Anthropic’s Q3 revenues flattening out and the IPO in jeopardy. I expect more efforts to prop up the money-furnace labs in the coming days.
This is the American way. More often after WW2. The country routinely goes to wars to impose and enforce its businesses. They have been known to do this in the name of democracy, the culture, and quite often in the name of freedom. This time it's safety; and no, it's not a war, not yet anyway – that's why this ban is nothing in comparison. Had it not been China, I'd not put any of those off the table for the land of the free.
We've entered a pretty adversarial era, and we know there are unexpected attack vectors available in frontier models. Just because you an inspect the weights doesn't mean you can derive the behavior.
I suspect the CCP would ban US models if they didn't need to distill them to make their own.
If that's truly your concern you should ban like 90% of anything containing any kind of electronic device because they're all either made in or transit via China at some point
> I suspect the CCP would ban US models if they didn't need to distill them to make their own.
I'm pretty sure they do, at least officially. But obviously the distillation and API proxies used by Chinese uses are unofficially tolerated and even exploited.
You're right, you can't run them in China, all models in China need to be vetted and approved by their cyberspace authority. But it's more of a "businesses cannot use them to provide services" kind of thing
A good case of "Don't do A or B, because A is bad"
Stop downloading cookie recipes from China, and you can't use cookie recipes that came from China either, because accessing the cookie recipe in China could give you malware.
It doesn't make much sense but this is the government that gave us such greats as "the internet isa series of tubes".
the order(paraphrased) is 'we are imediately ordering you to, or not to, rip out deep seek, depending on how you feel about that ,and what might go wrong, and write to us about it, sometime in the next couple of months'
> For purposes of this Order, an individual or business is an "affiliated entity" or "affiliate" of DeepSeek AG if, directly or indirectly, either one controls or can control the other; or a third party controls or can control both.
This does not apply to open model weights, which are not a product or service, and does not apply to independent hosts of model weights if they have no affiliation with DeepSeek as defined.
> DeepSeek models advance Chinese Communist Party (CCP) narratives much more frequently than U.S. models.
[1] https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2025/09/30/CAISI...
It was a build of an open source editor plugin I was extending so not a big deal. However it's made realise I need to add an egress proxy filtering internet access (although none that I've looked at yet work exactly the way I'd like)
That just means you don't even need to bother with fancy weight-based backdoors. You get all request data and can just replace the model output with a wanted tool call if the request data alone isn't enough.
Yes, in theory. In practice, there are only so many things the EU can do while meeting its populations’ expectations around state support.
Equivalent might be stretching it.
In practice, European companies don’t use Mistral.
First acknowledge the reality, then we can propose solutions.
What I would see even more likely are requirements of no agent commits, use of only human written/vetted code under their name.
For chatbot-style usage maybe, can’t really attest to that; for long-running, long-context “agentic” work including planning, within a harness etc., definitely not (yet).
> What I would see even more likely are requirements of no agent commits, use of only human written/vetted code under their name.
I mean in the end that’s what the Kernel project does now, IIRC? Everything has to have a response human’s sign-off.
From 5 days ago: https://projectdiscovery.io/research/how-abliterated-models-...
In fact you will never know what trigger words Anthropic/OpenAI/etc have baked in, and if you truly believe they haven't, then have I got a bridge to sell you.
https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/d00db56fa754a1b115b6dd7cb2e3c3...
https://simonwillison.net/2026/Jun/10/if-claude-fable-stops-...
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48467896
> Unlike our interventions for cybersecurity, biology and chemistry, and distillation attempts, these safeguards will not be visible to the user. Fable 5 will not fall back to a different model. Instead, the safeguards will limit effectiveness through methods such as prompt modification, steering vectors, or parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT).
Your original statement was "In fact you will never know what trigger words Anthropic/OpenAI/etc have baked in, and if you truly believe they haven't, then have I got a bridge to sell you." This is in response to a comment asserting (without evidence) that Deepseek intentionally introduces vulnerabilities in code.
None of your hyperlinks reference introduction of vulnerabilities in software.
Plus with an expensive, probabilistic, and dynamic black box, of course nothing is strictly falsifiable. By your logic nothing can be said about it. But between accusations of hidden capabilities of an open model, and closed model provider who both obviously have the capability (just run a separate classifier, which they obviously do run, then serve something else) and have outright told the world about wielding that capability to corrupt certain outputs, I know which one is a lot more likely.
The equivalent of a gratis non-open source app.
Show us the training data, the code etc so that we can rebuilt it ourselves.
- we don’t understand how LLMs work
- DeepSeek is funded through an state-backed investment fund
- China and the US are sort of adversaries
Isn’t that enough to be cautious at the very least?
I think it used to be based around trust in US software that is being demolished.
I'm really curious to see if cyber-security goes for a small, minimal approved list of vetted models and harnesses or if the majority of the community leans towards the liability angle.
Good luck with that one. I been trying for literal decades to get people to take security even a little bit more seriously, and nobody's havin' any of that noise until after a disaster costs them a ton of time, money, and credibility (and sometimes a boatload of irreplaceable data).
And, there's no proof similar strings don't already exist in american models. What if "{id}_{url}" works to send it to an arbitrary URL, not a preset XYZ one?
DeepSeek generates insecure code if you mention Tibet. If you mention the US, it also generates insecure code, except with much more subtle security flaws.
That's certainly no accident.
https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/crowdstrike-researche...
They claim the extract line is insecure, but never explain why, and without showing the rest of the code (what is $requiredHeaders? If it's sanitized this is a non issue) you can't even tell if it's secure or not.
The variable names being wrong (the $PayPal- ones) is probably just a "mistake" the model made, but it's not a vulnerability either.
This article could be just "burglars are burgling in your neighborhood, install our burglar alarm" from crowdstrike just as well.
The link you cited postulates it is accidental.
> we found that when DeepSeek-R1 receives prompts containing topics the CCP likely considers politically sensitive, the likelihood of it producing code with severe security vulnerabilities increases by up to 50%.
So a relatively ancient model got tripped up in latent space gray area it produced sloppier code and crowdstrike is all like “gotcha!” Sounds like the basic thesis? Not great support, more like FUD
The mechanism is likely a bit inverted, it’s the weights that have been redacted, but the effect is that weights that were interfered with are affecting the problem solving abilities of the LLM - I mean, it’s insecure bad code, not a backdoor, right?
hence, the text the model generates is arbitrary. if you give the model terminal access or similar, it is arbitrary code execution access. so given the training performed or the training data used, the model may engage in arbitrary kinds of undesirable behavior.
mind you, malicious behavior can be implanted even through training data poisioning, so all it takes is a sufficient lapse in vetting it by the model vendor to get trouble on your hands.
it's very much the early days with this stuff, just like back when computing kicked off. the big deal was that "thing exists at all". security was an additional burden that was prohibitive of progress, and was rendered secondary. remains true here as well.
Racism aside, one can prove a compiler is correct. It can be shown beyond a shadow of a doubt that a compiler produces correct output for a given input.
Would you use such a piece of software? Or is the boogeyman too scary?
I'm not sure how an unwillingness to trust the Chinese Communist Party is in any way "racist" exactly. I know lots of Chinese people I'm fairly sure I could trust, but the Chinese Communist Party ain't among 'em. Do you trust them?
Just because a compiler binary compiles program A without a backdoor, it does not prove it won't add a backdoor to program B.
Why not? Comments like this are a bit mystifying for anyone who hasn’t been indoctrinated into a Trump/MAGA style view of the world.
> Scientology is an evil cult, while Falun Gong is more like Buddhism. You can't really compare them.
maybe that's why not
Must one really be a MAGA Trump cultist to distrust the Chinese Communist Party?
This isn't racism, it's basic opsec.
Best greetings from my Oppo Find N6
So the Chinese version of the American CLOUD Act?
Nobody in congress knows what a "Minimax" is, so they're safe from discrimination, for now.
What the western elites fear above all else is Chinese brands getting recognizable and popular.
Or, worst comes to worst, as Snowden has revealed, the NSA will just clandestinely hack American companies, as they did to Google when they rolled out TLS for search.
We're on HN, not The Onion's comment section. People will take this seriously rather than sarcasm.
It was sarcasm, right?
It doesn't seem that they have found the models to be actively poisoned, though.
"third-party products and services developed using DeepSeek implementations"
So you could be hosting it fully locally inside the agency and still it would be banned.
It's not surprising to me, but it's pretty blunt. Not that I care what US agencies do, but this does seem like the first step of many to come.
I realize that non-US nations could ask the same about the US. All I will say is that there are consequences to failing to nurture a competitive tech industry - even Mistral is basing their newest models on China open-weights models. Unlike the EU, the US government is fortunate to have a choice.
There is nothing else to see other than the US losing at their own game and panicking
Again, hosting providers eventually get RCE by being able to send whatever bash commands they want to run on the machine running the agent. It is very important who you give this power to.
No one was saying "Oh McAfee is really gonna control the us's antivirus market regulations" after they banned kaspersky.
We've entered a pretty adversarial era, and we know there are unexpected attack vectors available in frontier models. Just because you an inspect the weights doesn't mean you can derive the behavior.
I suspect the CCP would ban US models if they didn't need to distill them to make their own.
I'm pretty sure they do, at least officially. But obviously the distillation and API proxies used by Chinese uses are unofficially tolerated and even exploited.
Stop downloading cookie recipes from China, and you can't use cookie recipes that came from China either, because accessing the cookie recipe in China could give you malware.
It doesn't make much sense but this is the government that gave us such greats as "the internet isa series of tubes".
Also China bans US technology all the time. Remember the Great Firewall of China? Or when Xi told Trump, “no thanks” to buying NVidia cards
Chinese people buy iphone, buy tesla, use Windows, travel with USA made airplane etc