> [Opexus] said that “the individuals responsible for hiring the twins are no longer employed by Opexus.”
Getting close to the classic Monty Python line: "Those responsible for sacking the people who have just been sacked, have been sacked."
Jokes aside, stuff like this sucks because I suspect many employers will take from it the most extreme, dehumanizing lessons, e.g.: (a) make firings [edit: including lay-offs] as abrupt as possible including terminating all access immediately, (b) never give second chances to anyone with any sort of criminal record (even say decades old marijuana posession or something).
I'd prefer a more balanced version: limit unilateral access to sensitive systems in general (not just of recently-fired employees), when someone is fired immediately shut off particularly sensitive credentials if they do exist (but not their general-purpose login/email account), avoid hiring people convicted of wire fraud as sysadmins, hash your @!#$ing passwords, etc.
When you are talking about access like they had "make firings as abrupt as possible including terminating all access immediately" not doing this is incompetence. This is absolutely a standard and has to be for these kinds of positions. I've never worked anywhere where it wasn't for the majority of IT staff. You meet with HR, someone clears your desk, and security walks you out.
There is a middleground, but it requires conscious effort to prop-up, support, and maintain over the long haul: off-boarding centers.
I worked for a Big Tech company that actually did this, and it made the transition a lot easier. You could still access corporate resources necessary for the transition (HR, benefits, internal job postings, training offerings, expense reporting, etc), check-in with colleagues 1:1 (who would be warned this person was no longer part of the org, attachments could be blocked to prevent exfil, etc), and still send/receive email internally (though external was blocked by default and required justification).
You can safeguard your corporate infrastructure without actually cutting everything off entirely and sending someone home to stew angrily about it. In fact, there might be (as yet undocumented) advantages to letting folks exist in that transition period on that segmented infrastructure, so as to identify potentially bad actors before they can do harm and see about mending bridges.
Of course all of that requires conscious investment in projects with no clear quarterly/yearly KPIs to measure cost or success against, so most employers will never remotely consider it.
Yeah but if you defense against somebody erasing a database is "we remove their access when they're fired" then your defense is garbage.
Like there's so many other attack vectors besides an upset ex-employee.. Like all those articles about NK employees who presumably are trying very hard not to be fired. Or employees using company provided insecure email software leaving them vulnerable to ransomware et al.
> When you are talking about access like they had "make firings as abrupt as possible including terminating all access immediately" not doing this is incompetence.
You're proving my point—employers take the most extreme lesson and it's considered expected practice. They absolutely should have immediately terminated the credentials that granted unilateral access to sensitive databases. (Ideally those would never exist in the first place—there are two-person schemes. A pair of bad actors...well apparently happens according to this article...but is far more unusual.) But employers regularly (but shouldn't) terminate all access including credentials that allow last email to colleagues exchanging personal contact info or something.
Yeah I don't see why that's necessary. I'm sure you can always reach out to HR and ask (I have facilitated this in the past, pulling contact lists and phone numbers) but that also gives them ways to exfiltrate data. It's company data. Just think of all the info you have in your inbox. Unless you've managed offboarding for high level IT positions it seems harsh, but the risk is just too high to allow the user to do that stuff themselves.
> Just think of all the info you have in your inbox.
Meh? Sure, stuff that would help assemble a credible phishing attack, but not customer SPII or huge amounts of intellectual property or anything. If the assumption is that employees' inboxes are full of dangerous things, I would focus on fixing that.
Jokes aside, stuff like this sucks because I suspect many employers will take from it the most extreme, dehumanizing lessons, e.g.: (a) make firings [edit: including lay-offs] as abrupt as possible including terminating all access immediately
The employee is always the last to know. This is standard fare.
How did they get access to 5k passwords? Are they being sent/stored in cleartext? This is the most baffling part of the article for me.
The second part I'm unclear about is how you could pass SOC2 when you aren't terminating account access simultaneously with the employment termination.
From the article, it sounds like the passwords are indeed stored in cleartext:
> On Feb. 1, 2025, Muneeb Akhter asked Sohaib Akhter for the plaintext password of an individual who submitted a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Public Portal, which was maintained by the Akhters’ employer. Sohaib Akhter conducted a database query on the EEOC database and then provided the password to Muneeb Akhter. That password was subsequently used to access that individual’s email account without authorization.
And how exactly do you want to store passwords if not in plain text (and then encrypted of course)? 5k is a lot, the authorization process is broken, but this is not related to how the passwords are stored.
The only solution is correct access segregation and a bastion
You should never store passwords in plain-text, encrypted or not, you should always use a one-way cryptographic hash like bcrypt [0], scrypt [1], or PBKDF2 [2], combined with a single use salt [3] and optionally a pepper [4], and then store the output of the hash in the database.
To confirm a user supplied password matches you run input into the same hash function again with the salt+pepper and compare it to the value in the database.
That way if the database is stolen, the attacker cannot recover the contents of the passwords without brute forcing them. Encrypting passwords is not recommended because too often attackers are able to recover the encryption keys during the same attack where the password data is extracted.
Typically you store a hash of user passwords instead, then when logging in you hash the user password client-side and compare the hashes. This acts like a one-way function that protects the password while letting the user authenticate themselves.
Also, you need to add salt. Otherwise every person using "Password123" has the exact same hash. Before they broke their search engine, it was common to google the MD5/MD4 hashes to "decrypt" or "unhash" them.
> At 4:58 pm, he wiped out a Department of Homeland Security database using the command “DROP DATABASE dhsproddb.”
This article is hilarious. The two bickering brothers remind me of the guys in the Oceans movies played by Casey Affleck and Scott Caan. It’s amazing they got this close to sensitive data.
> At 4:59 pm, he asked an AI tool, “How do i clear system logs from SQL servers after deleting databases?” He later asked, “How do you clear all event and application logs from Microsoft windows server 2012?”
The tools we use are not neutral. A sword can be made to work like an axe, but we use axes for chopping wood because a sword makes a shitty axe. A sword is designed to kill people. The handle, the mass, the weight distribution, and every other aspect I am not qualified to get in to, means swords are designed to kill. They are a tool, and their use is not neutral.
This is a clear example, but I don't believe any tools are neutral. Your immediate fallback was to a hammer, not a mouse, with the obvious corrollary being to bludgeon, but the same line applies. Tools are not neutral, and that's why when you looked for something that causes harm, you grabbed something that's objectively been serving a dual-purpose for hundreds of years. Nobody's using a computer mouse to bludgeon someone to death; it makes a shitty bludgeon, and the design of the tool reflects that.
That's also why these comparisons always fall back to knives, or hammers, or the AK-47: they are dangerous tools that are designed to make killing easier. Nobody is making these comparisons to more benign tools, like desk lamps, coffee cups, or car stereos, and it's because tools are not neutral, and none of my examples are designed to make direct, bodily harm, easier.
> On March 12, 2025, a search warrant was executed at Sohaib’s home in Alexandria. Agents grabbed plenty of tech gear but also turned up seven firearms and 370 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition. Given his former crimes, Sohaib should have had none of this.
For god's sake, don't commit crimes while you're committing crimes.
I was kind of hoping he sprinted out his back door which happened to be on a state line and then mailed his guns back to his house, just to try to cover everything.
I have no problem with my credentials being revoked everywhere before I know about a layoff. I don't really care how I learn about it, just please don't make me come in to the office.
I've never had a job with a permanent individual desk like this. The one in-person real job I had, it was only shared working space that different people used at different times of the day or on different days, and I think you were discouraged from leaving anything. The idea of there being "your desk" with a framed photo of your kids and favorite coffee mug seems like a nearly extinct piece of nostalgia. It must have been nice in a way, far preferable to the new style of open office at least.
Meh. Don't leave anything at work. Forgo the convenience and carry your things on your commute. Use a bag. If there's "too much stuff", that's a sign to pare back what you "need" at work.
I know this is not a good year on the job market, but if you are traveling to work with a "go bag" and not leaving coffee mugs on your desk to prepare for being laid off maybe it is time to carry that go bag to some other buildings...
The obvious middle ground is don’t leave anything valuable at your desk that you wouldn’t want to lose. You shouldn’t leave valuable stuff at your desk even if you don’t expect to be laid off. Unless you work in a very secure environment, you don’t really know who will be sniffing around your desk.
Go ahead and leave a coffee mug, who cares if you lose a coffee mug?
God, if we're at the point where we're so paranoid about being laid off that we don't dare leave a single piece of personal property in the office then I think we're in a very dark place indeed. Can’t imagine the mental damage from considering losing your job every single day you wake up.
I never left anything valuable or personal at my desk when I worked in an office simply because I had a very nonzero number of colleagues who acted like animals. My fizzy waters, coffee, and snacks would be consumed without permission or replenishment. Chairs, monitors, and input peripherals would get swapped without asking. Desks surfaces would be sat on with chairs used as footstools. Corporate effluvia of all types would end up on my "unused desk" because I wasn't in at the exact moment some roving bandit walked by looking for a spot to dump their crates of paper and binders.
Some people simply have no regard for others and will mess with or jack your shit. Don't give them the chance.
I always thought it was weird that all of the equipment issued to me beyond the laptop was registered to me, such as the monitors and desk phone. Your comment enlightens me... That's wild to imagine folks just swiping things from other peoples desks. We even have storage rooms of office supplies where someone could drop off their crate of paper and binders if they had one for some reason.
well this did just happen to me. laid off while taking care of my father in laws estate and my personal belongings were thrown away. 7 years at the company as an EM ftr.
I had my gym stuff in a gym locker. The reason I was able to commit to a gym routine was being able to get off my desk, get down the elevator, enter the gym and change in gym clothes in literally 5 minutes. I would never be willing to commute with all that gear. And I never got that gear back.
Same, almost. When I was a student, I rented a locker near the showers so I could start my day at the school gym, shower, and go to my first class.
My workplaces have not had gyms, but I bought equipment for my home that maintains the streamline. I haven't been perfect at my routine because my work schedule isn't consistent which is annoying, but I do still get some exercise in at least twice per week with it. I doubt I'd be getting at least that otherwise.
Yes, I will bag my two tree-sized plants, 4 paintings, 1 old map, 2 posters, drawings of my kids, figurines and a few more things. Ah yes, the ball I sit on.
I spend in the office more time than at home so I want a nice environment.
So this was why the FBI Director Kash Patel was in a panic when he couldn't log in one day. Revoking credentials before firing someone makes a lot of sense in security.
no, becaus the simple and pragmatic solution for ANYONE who is subject to arbitrary termination, is to litter everything they build with caltrops and dead man triggers
and then hint that they will go into "consulting" when fired.
I know of one case where this was totaly unintentional, and a machinest at a local pulp and paper plant had self delegated to
write the software that controlled tension
on the giant machines in the mill, but as it was his only real forey into sofware, nobody else could operate it, and they fired him after a manegment reshuffle, and then after the next scheduled shut down, nothing worked right, greasy dusty ancient screen with a blinking cursor was what they had, plugged into the important bits of a half sqare mile plant.
still funny to think about!
Or if you don't want to booby trap your code, buy one of those tiny devices that make a cricket noise randomly every 5-15 minutes, and hide it somewhere in the restroom.
These are too obvious - 5-15 minutes gives your victim way too many opportunities to narrow down the location.
What you really need is one that chirps once every (multiple of) 20-28 hours (with weighting towards 23-25 to keep it roughly around the time you set it going and an infrequent skipping of a day.) Also with different volumes and, ideally, different chirps. Occasionally a double chirp just for extra insanity causing.
(A Michael Jackson "hee heee" would be another good option.)
Dude, I got background checked heavier and harder than my immigration just to work in a big SaaS company.
This articles WTF/Second was around ~3 for me.
Some of those moments:
- Previous conviction
- Served time (2 and 3 years)
- Muneeb Akhter asked Sohaib Akhter for the plaintext password of an individual
Which he received, and then got to the email of that individual due to a password re-use it seems.
BUT WHY WERE THERE A PLAINTEXT PASSWORD IN THE FIRST PLACE?!
- Muneeb had been assembling usernames and passwords—5,400 of them
- for instance, his “marriott_checker.py” application tested the logins against Marriott’s hotel chains. Muneeb managed to log in successfully hundreds of times, including to DocuSign and airline accounts. Sometimes, if victims had airline miles stored, Muneeb would book travel for himself.
- wiped out a Department of Homeland Security database using the command “DROP DATABASE dhsproddb.”
1. lol @ leaking the db name
2. "Department of Homeland Security". Admin (or near admin) access. By a convicted felon. who's also actively commiting crimes.
- He later asked [from AI], “How do you clear all event and application logs from Microsoft windows server 2012?”
Windows Server 2012?!!!
- In the space of a single hour, Muneeb deleted around 96 databases with US government information. He downloaded 1,805 files belonging to the EEOC and stashed them on a USB drive, then grabbed federal tax information for at least 450 people.
> Muneeb Akhter asked Sohaib Akhter for the plaintext password of an individual who submitted a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Public Portal, which was maintained by the Akhters’ employer. Sohaib Akhter conducted a database query on the EEOC database and then provided the password to Muneeb Akhter.
Not many people test their backups. I've encountered some situations where the backups didn't work. And one previous employer who was so lazy that he didn't rotate the backup tapes so that the one tape cartridge was used so long that the oxide layer was rubbed off of the tape - so it was no longer brown but was transparent instead (imagine adhesive tape with no adhesive).
I can understand wanting to be perceived as being on “the right team” but that comment is so silly that it undermines credibility. To put it otherwise, could you imagine a scenario where I had a labor, arbitrage opportunity that involved a higher paying job in Shanghai, China and that I had lived there for a few years to do that. Let’s also say that I was found guilty of some similar crime. Would you call me a good old fashioned red-blooded Chinese crook?
It’s OK to acknowledge that economic migrants are a thing, and that they likely have only transactional interest in where they live, such as a Bengali construction worker in Dubai, for example. That’s just part and parcel of labor mobility. For better or worse, shareholders, or middleman representing shareholders, have decided this sort of thing is a really good idea in the US, and now around half the population falls in that bucket. It’s a free country, and freedom means being free to choose short term interests. That also means you’re free to support such policies because they are good for Blue-team redistricting so we can provide free healthcare to all 8 billion people in the world somehow.
But please, nobody becomes a Yankee by the mere fact of standing on the ground. If you want that pejorative title, then you need to earn it.
Uhh... The guy in charge of the whole thing does things a foreign adversary would do. Has for years and he's back for round two. He even tried to overthrow the government once.
> On Feb. 1, 2025, Muneeb Akhter asked Sohaib Akhter for the plaintext password of an individual who submitted a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Public Portal, which was maintained by the Akhters’ employer. Sohaib Akhter conducted a database query on the EEOC database and then provided the password to Muneeb Akhter. That password was subsequently used to access that individual’s email account without authorization.
It should be a federal crime with prison time to make a DB for a federal agency and not hash and salt passwords or other auth credentials.
It's probably some sort of crusty old application written before salt and hash was SOP. No agency is going to spend money on hardening something non-critical unless there's an incident or there's free money to do so. And that application was likely written by some contractor who's no longer around or has the source code available so any fixes would require an entire redo. And while you're redoing the whole thing, let's add in a bunch of features and scope creep to balloon the cost and schedule. Oops, the new contractor writing the app is overrun so let's bail and go back to the old version.
How on earth did someone previously convicted of what sounds like hacking get job access to so many prod government databases? Wild that it took them so long to get caught.
I had the same questions. Apparently discovery of the prior conviction is what lead to them being fired:
> When the company discovered Sohaib Akhter’s felony conviction, it terminated both brothers’ employment during an online remote meeting on Feb. 18, 2025
The company involved here is apparently based in Washington, DC, which has a "Ban the Box" ordinance that limits employment background checks for most kinds of jobs. And apparently DC's version of the law is particularly strict.
Shouldn't this force companies that need to pass a SOC2 out of the district? Doesn't SOC2 require background investigation of personnel with access to sensitive systems?
And I recently couldn't get a job through a federal contractor for a federal position (requiring NO security clearance) because they didn't like something on my credit report.
Deleting data like that is a crime investigated by the FBI. In a very sad story, a brilliant former coworker made a mistake of deleting data after leaving employment and ended up in prison. Brilliant guy, momentary mistake. Overzealous employer.
Remind me of a forum a long time ago that sent me my password in clear when I used the "forgot password" link.
When I advised them that it was a bad idea to store password in clear, they answered that they keep it in clear so that they can send it when someone forget.
Circa 2012 the San Francisco water bill pay was able to send me my password in plaintext when I forgot it. I was scandalized. But the alternative was to not pay the water bill, so I just made extra sure the password was very random and wasn't one that got re-used anywhere... I think they fixed this issue in the years since.
In my free time, I help maintain the web presence for a small non-profit org with memberships. The original system when I started helping was a bespoke system that was smart in many ways (essentially a static site generator with membership control years before SSGs were cool, with regular automated tests), but the guy who wrote it absolutely insisted on storing passwords in plaintext and could not be convinced otherwise. Eventually he had to drop the volunteer position due to other things in life, and the first thing we did was correct this issue.
There was a screenshot of some website floating around a few years ago, where if you entered the correct password but a wrong username, it would helpfully tell you which user the password is really for.
I've got a better one. I once had the same argument mentioned to me by my manager at the time when I pointed out that passwords were being stored in clear text. That it needs to be this way so that it is read/sent when the users forget their passwords(which happened a lot). I tried to explain that typically a "reset password" flow is used for that but that fell on deaf ears. That system contained healthcare data.
Something bad did end up happening due to that lax security and there were oh so many meetings about it.
> Something bad did end up happening due to that lax security and there were oh so many meetings about it.
This is the sort of thing that makes me want to check out of the whole circus. Here I am, telling you ahead of time, and you ignored me
So how there's a circus that we could have avoided and not only do I get zero recognition for identifying the threat ahead of time, the people who ignored me keep their jobs and turn it into a zoo where everyone is scrambling in endless meetings
And I've seen it play out a few times. After a point, why bother...
"Legal Eagle" has a new video about this. The administration's viewpoint is that the Presidential Records Act is unconstitutional, plus the President owns every document, so he can't be forced to return anything because it belongs to him.
Getting close to the classic Monty Python line: "Those responsible for sacking the people who have just been sacked, have been sacked."
Jokes aside, stuff like this sucks because I suspect many employers will take from it the most extreme, dehumanizing lessons, e.g.: (a) make firings [edit: including lay-offs] as abrupt as possible including terminating all access immediately, (b) never give second chances to anyone with any sort of criminal record (even say decades old marijuana posession or something).
I'd prefer a more balanced version: limit unilateral access to sensitive systems in general (not just of recently-fired employees), when someone is fired immediately shut off particularly sensitive credentials if they do exist (but not their general-purpose login/email account), avoid hiring people convicted of wire fraud as sysadmins, hash your @!#$ing passwords, etc.
I worked for a Big Tech company that actually did this, and it made the transition a lot easier. You could still access corporate resources necessary for the transition (HR, benefits, internal job postings, training offerings, expense reporting, etc), check-in with colleagues 1:1 (who would be warned this person was no longer part of the org, attachments could be blocked to prevent exfil, etc), and still send/receive email internally (though external was blocked by default and required justification).
You can safeguard your corporate infrastructure without actually cutting everything off entirely and sending someone home to stew angrily about it. In fact, there might be (as yet undocumented) advantages to letting folks exist in that transition period on that segmented infrastructure, so as to identify potentially bad actors before they can do harm and see about mending bridges.
Of course all of that requires conscious investment in projects with no clear quarterly/yearly KPIs to measure cost or success against, so most employers will never remotely consider it.
Like there's so many other attack vectors besides an upset ex-employee.. Like all those articles about NK employees who presumably are trying very hard not to be fired. Or employees using company provided insecure email software leaving them vulnerable to ransomware et al.
You're proving my point—employers take the most extreme lesson and it's considered expected practice. They absolutely should have immediately terminated the credentials that granted unilateral access to sensitive databases. (Ideally those would never exist in the first place—there are two-person schemes. A pair of bad actors...well apparently happens according to this article...but is far more unusual.) But employers regularly (but shouldn't) terminate all access including credentials that allow last email to colleagues exchanging personal contact info or something.
Meh? Sure, stuff that would help assemble a credible phishing attack, but not customer SPII or huge amounts of intellectual property or anything. If the assumption is that employees' inboxes are full of dangerous things, I would focus on fixing that.
The employee is always the last to know. This is standard fare.
The second part I'm unclear about is how you could pass SOC2 when you aren't terminating account access simultaneously with the employment termination.
> On Feb. 1, 2025, Muneeb Akhter asked Sohaib Akhter for the plaintext password of an individual who submitted a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Public Portal, which was maintained by the Akhters’ employer. Sohaib Akhter conducted a database query on the EEOC database and then provided the password to Muneeb Akhter. That password was subsequently used to access that individual’s email account without authorization.
The only solution is correct access segregation and a bastion
To confirm a user supplied password matches you run input into the same hash function again with the salt+pepper and compare it to the value in the database.
That way if the database is stolen, the attacker cannot recover the contents of the passwords without brute forcing them. Encrypting passwords is not recommended because too often attackers are able to recover the encryption keys during the same attack where the password data is extracted.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bcrypt
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scrypt
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PBKDF2
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_(cryptography)
[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pepper_(cryptography)
This article is hilarious. The two bickering brothers remind me of the guys in the Oceans movies played by Casey Affleck and Scott Caan. It’s amazing they got this close to sensitive data.
So many red flags, I can't even.
This is a clear example, but I don't believe any tools are neutral. Your immediate fallback was to a hammer, not a mouse, with the obvious corrollary being to bludgeon, but the same line applies. Tools are not neutral, and that's why when you looked for something that causes harm, you grabbed something that's objectively been serving a dual-purpose for hundreds of years. Nobody's using a computer mouse to bludgeon someone to death; it makes a shitty bludgeon, and the design of the tool reflects that.
That's also why these comparisons always fall back to knives, or hammers, or the AK-47: they are dangerous tools that are designed to make killing easier. Nobody is making these comparisons to more benign tools, like desk lamps, coffee cups, or car stereos, and it's because tools are not neutral, and none of my examples are designed to make direct, bodily harm, easier.
No need to knee jerk react to an argument that hasn't been made.
The fact that they didn't already know how to do it is the crazy part.
For god's sake, don't commit crimes while you're committing crimes.
But how do you pick up the stuff from your desk? I once lost a nice pair of headphones this way.
Go ahead and leave a coffee mug, who cares if you lose a coffee mug?
Some people simply have no regard for others and will mess with or jack your shit. Don't give them the chance.
Still a net positive in my experience.
My workplaces have not had gyms, but I bought equipment for my home that maintains the streamline. I haven't been perfect at my routine because my work schedule isn't consistent which is annoying, but I do still get some exercise in at least twice per week with it. I doubt I'd be getting at least that otherwise.
I spend in the office more time than at home so I want a nice environment.
Ever tried to login with two factor and justify a maxed out company card while high as a kite and drunk?
It’s stressful.
I know of one case where this was totaly unintentional, and a machinest at a local pulp and paper plant had self delegated to write the software that controlled tension on the giant machines in the mill, but as it was his only real forey into sofware, nobody else could operate it, and they fired him after a manegment reshuffle, and then after the next scheduled shut down, nothing worked right, greasy dusty ancient screen with a blinking cursor was what they had, plugged into the important bits of a half sqare mile plant. still funny to think about!
https://annoyingpcb.com/
What you really need is one that chirps once every (multiple of) 20-28 hours (with weighting towards 23-25 to keep it roughly around the time you set it going and an infrequent skipping of a day.) Also with different volumes and, ideally, different chirps. Occasionally a double chirp just for extra insanity causing.
(A Michael Jackson "hee heee" would be another good option.)
This articles WTF/Second was around ~3 for me.
Some of those moments:
- Previous conviction - Served time (2 and 3 years) - Muneeb Akhter asked Sohaib Akhter for the plaintext password of an individual Which he received, and then got to the email of that individual due to a password re-use it seems. BUT WHY WERE THERE A PLAINTEXT PASSWORD IN THE FIRST PLACE?!
- Muneeb had been assembling usernames and passwords—5,400 of them - for instance, his “marriott_checker.py” application tested the logins against Marriott’s hotel chains. Muneeb managed to log in successfully hundreds of times, including to DocuSign and airline accounts. Sometimes, if victims had airline miles stored, Muneeb would book travel for himself.
- wiped out a Department of Homeland Security database using the command “DROP DATABASE dhsproddb.” 1. lol @ leaking the db name 2. "Department of Homeland Security". Admin (or near admin) access. By a convicted felon. who's also actively commiting crimes.
- He later asked [from AI], “How do you clear all event and application logs from Microsoft windows server 2012?” Windows Server 2012?!!!
- In the space of a single hour, Muneeb deleted around 96 databases with US government information. He downloaded 1,805 files belonging to the EEOC and stashed them on a USB drive, then grabbed federal tax information for at least 450 people.
Jesus.
storing passwords in plaintext should be persecuted & having unlimited access to customer databases.
WTF?
Hilarious in the context of this administration.
It’s OK to acknowledge that economic migrants are a thing, and that they likely have only transactional interest in where they live, such as a Bengali construction worker in Dubai, for example. That’s just part and parcel of labor mobility. For better or worse, shareholders, or middleman representing shareholders, have decided this sort of thing is a really good idea in the US, and now around half the population falls in that bucket. It’s a free country, and freedom means being free to choose short term interests. That also means you’re free to support such policies because they are good for Blue-team redistricting so we can provide free healthcare to all 8 billion people in the world somehow.
But please, nobody becomes a Yankee by the mere fact of standing on the ground. If you want that pejorative title, then you need to earn it.
In fact I’d guess they’re not, since they’ve been employed on government projects since a young age.
This does not mean they are from another country.
It should be a federal crime with prison time to make a DB for a federal agency and not hash and salt passwords or other auth credentials.
> When the company discovered Sohaib Akhter’s felony conviction, it terminated both brothers’ employment during an online remote meeting on Feb. 18, 2025
from https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-jury-convicts-virgina... which is a better source on this.
That prompts the question of why background checks are so lax that they were hired before this was discovered.
When I advised them that it was a bad idea to store password in clear, they answered that they keep it in clear so that they can send it when someone forget.
Defeated by such argument, I deleted my account.
I'd bet your account wasn't actually deleted, just marked as deleted or inactive.
Something bad did end up happening due to that lax security and there were oh so many meetings about it.
This is the sort of thing that makes me want to check out of the whole circus. Here I am, telling you ahead of time, and you ignored me
So how there's a circus that we could have avoided and not only do I get zero recognition for identifying the threat ahead of time, the people who ignored me keep their jobs and turn it into a zoo where everyone is scrambling in endless meetings
And I've seen it play out a few times. After a point, why bother...
all with pardons waiting so they can't be convicted
they might not even wait a few years