Is there some part of PCI auditing requirements that is getting misinterpreted by some auditors to demand this? Though in my experience with standards like this what auditors want to see and what the standards say often have only loose overlap anyhow.
Sounds like someone is being "overenthusiastic" about interpreting the KYC/ALM regulations.
Combined with the FSFE not being your "usual" charitable or business organization so setting off auditor red flags and perhaps raising the risk profile of Nexi as a payment processor.
The FSFE justly drew the line at providing private information of supporters. How many other customers of Nexi simply handed over such data 'because audit'?
> Over the past few months, our former payment provider Nexi S.p.A. (“Nexi”) requested access to private data, which we understood to be specifically the usernames and passwords of our supporters.
I must be missing something, but why is there an expectation that clear text passwords would even be known?
As an Italian living in another EU country, I always thought that the amount of (broken) bureaucracy of Italy was not particularly worse. However this story comes after a couple more I heard this week, in a line of absurd practice possibly due to absurd regulations.
We work with MLS provider(s) that requires us to keep plaintext password for our users and provide it on request in case of `breach in the security of MLS Listing Information or a violation of MLS Rules`.
The user is accessing only copy of their data in _our_ systems, the user has no contact with MLS itself directly or indirectly.
It's entirely possible that is actually what they wanted (at least what the people in the company they were talking to wanted). I suspect that "we understood to mean" is language carefully designed to avoid a lawsuit.
You could put it this way, but to me the bigger question is why would a payment processor have such ridiculous requests? That probably should be examined first.
[1] https://serverfault.com/questions/293217/our-security-audito...
Combined with the FSFE not being your "usual" charitable or business organization so setting off auditor red flags and perhaps raising the risk profile of Nexi as a payment processor.
I must be missing something, but why is there an expectation that clear text passwords would even be known?
The user is accessing only copy of their data in _our_ systems, the user has no contact with MLS itself directly or indirectly.